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Abstract— Driving is a social activity: drivers often indicate
their intent to change lanes via motion cues. We consider mixed-
autonomy traffic where a Human-driven Vehicle (HV) and an
Autonomous Vehicle (AV) drive together. We propose a planning
framework where the degree to which the AV considers the
other agent’s reward is controlled by a selfishness factor. We
test our approach on a simulated two-lane highway where the
AV and HV merge into each other’s lanes. In a user study with
21 subjects and 6 different selfishness factors, we found that
our planning approach was sound and that both agents had
less merging times when a factor that balances the rewards for
the two agents was chosen. Our results on double lane merging
suggest it to be a non-zero-sum game and encourage further
investigation on collaborative decision making algorithms for
mixed-autonomy traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Driving is a social activity: drivers indicate their willing-
ness to change lanes by subtle cues such as eye contact, or by
not-so-subtle cues such as adjusting their speed and position
[1]. There has been impressive demonstrations
of Autonomous Vehicle (AV) technology [2]–[4], however
one of the remaining challenges in this area is reading
those cues to estimate the intentions of other agents as
well as using cues to communicate the intentions of the
AV. As AVs become commonplace, the situations where
AV’s and Human-driven Vehicles (HV) interact will increase.
A number of issues in mixed-autonomy traffic need to be
addressed before wide deployment, many posing interesting
technical challenges.
Prior work focused on designing robust controllers for
low-level tasks such as lane following and lane changing [3]–
[7] either considered the other drivers as obstacles to avoid
[5], [7] or did not consider their presence while modeling
[6]. Close interactions with other agents in high-level tasks
like deciding when to pass or change lanes [8], [9] require
a more sophisticated model. For instance, a highway merge
where there is a short distance to the next exit creates a
situation where cars entering and exiting have to negotiate
with one another to merge safely into their desired lanes. In
this paper, we study a planning approach for navigating an
autonomous vehicle for this challenging double lane merge
in the presence of a human-driven car, see Fig. 1.
Recent progress in Reinforcement Learning (RL) has led
to work exploring its application to autonomous driving [10],
[11]. However, most of this progress was for the single-agent
setting but driving is inherently multi-agent. [10] solve the
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Fig. 1: Double lane merging problem. The autonomous and human-
driven vehicles start together and aim to switch lanes. Successful
merging requires signaling the agent’s own intent while estimating
the other’s intention and then acting on it.
issue by only considering the other agent’s actions through
statistics of the traffic and although, [11] study the double
lane merging problem in a multi-agent framework, they
simplify the problem using expert knowledge. Similar to
our approach of online planning, RL with Monte Carlo tree
search [12] has been applied to autonomous driving in [13].
The idea of an autonomous agent acting deliberately
to be predictable was formalized by [14]. Game theoretic
models have been used to model human’s adaptation to
the robot [15] in the human-robot interaction domain. We
are also influenced by research on collaborative planning
with pedestrians for navigating a mobile robot in a social
environment [16], [17]. Our work is most related to [18],
which leverages the adaptability of the human by being
cognizant of the effect the AV’s actions have on the human
driver. They show that the AV can influence a human driver
such as making them slow down by moving in front of them.
However, while their approach maximizes the AV’s own
reward, it is not uncommon to see people slow down and
let others into their lane while driving. Inspired by this
idea of consideration and of leveraging the adaptability of
HVs, we frame mixed-autonomy driving as a collaboration.
In particular, we consider the double lane merging problem
where the AV and HV start in adjacent lanes and must merge
into each others’ lanes in a limited road length. The actions of
the AV are considered explicitly via collaborative planning
with those of the HV to optimize a collective reward that
combines the rewards of both of the agents. We validate
our planning approach in simulation and conduct a user
study where subjects can engage in interactions with our
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autonomous agents. We study the effect of the AV having
different levels of selfishness with users.
We make the following two contributions:
• A mixed-autonomy merge planning algorithm that is
able to vary its consideration for other drivers with a
single tunable selfishness factor.
• Demonstration that an AV with balanced consideration
leads to better performance for both agents, suggesting
that lane merging is a non-zero sum game.
II. PROBLEM
This paper assumes a discrete-time Markov Decision Pro-
cess defined by,
M = 〈S,U, T,R〉, (1)
where S ⊆ Rn is a n-dimensional state space, U =
{1, ...,K} is the set of discrete actions the system can
perform, T : S×U → S is a deterministic transition function,
and R : S → R is a reward function.
A. State Representation
The state representation s provides full information of the
vehicles present in the system. It contains the continuous lat-
eral x and longitudinal positions y, as well as the longitudinal
speed v of all cars including the AV.
s = (yi, xi, vi)i∈{1,..,k} (2)
Where k is the number of cars in the environment. Since
the focus of this study is on decision-making pertaining
to intelligent interaction we limit the scope to the fully-
observable setting.
B. Action Representation
The action representation u contains actions for each car
u = (ui)i∈{1,..,k}. Each car has five control actions available
to them at every time-step:
• accelerate: increases the speed by a constant factor.
• decelerate: decreases the speed by a constant factor.
• stay: maintains the speed.
• turn-right: moves the car in the positive latitudinal
direction while reducing its longitudinal motion.
• turn-left: moves the car in the negative latitudinal
direction while reducing its longitudinal motion.
The right and left actions are not permitted if the car is
at the rightmost and leftmost edges of the road respectively.
These discrete high-level actions were chosen because the
article aims to study the high-level decision-making of the
cars and so a controller is assumed.
C. Dynamics
The state at the next time-step is determined by applying
a control action to each car in the system st+1 = T (st, u).
These actions enable longitudinal and lateral control of the
car and are applied instantaneously. The dynamics follow
a simple deterministic model for each car. The accelerate,
decelerate and stay actions change the state of the corre-
sponding vehicle in the following way.
vt+1 = vt + a∆t (3)
yt+1 = yt + vt∆t (4)
xt+1 = xt (5)
Here, ∆t is the length of the time-step and a is the
acceleration. For the turning actions we introduce a fixed
lateral velocity (vlat),
vxt = min{vt, vlat} (6)
vyt =
√
v2t − vxt 2 (7)
yt+1 = yt + v
y
t ∆t (8)
xt+1 = xt + v
x
t ∆t (9)
vt+1 = vt (10)
D. Problem Domain
We use the two-lane scenario depicted in Fig. 1 where
the HV and AV start in adjacent lanes and have the goal of
merging into each other’s lanes before the road ends. Here,
if the cars change lanes independent (without regard) of each
other it can cause a collision, which leads to the interesting
challenge of planning while cognizant of the human driver’s
goals. The investigation is restricted to a two car scenario,
with one human driver (H) and the other an AV, which will
be referred to as the robot (R) car. We do so to reduce the
effect of other interactions like HV-HV and AV-AV, and make
the effects of the focus of our study - interactions between
HVs and AVs - more clearly observable.
Even though our approach is extensible to multiple cars,
we limit the system to two cars in this discussion and
will apply a subscript of R or H to the AV and human,
respectively. Thus, the state s is composed of the state
for the human sH and that of the robot sR, where sH =
(yH , xH , vH) and sR = (yR, xR, vR). We assume that the
AV has noise-free access to the state at the current time st
and the human’s goal.
E. Reward
The goal of the AV is to reach its target lane (lgoal) while
avoiding collisions and preferring to drive in the center of the
lane. We encoded this high-level goal into a simple reward
function that gets applied at every time-step. It has a high
negative reward for collisions and a positive one for being in
the goal-lane. To keep the car near the center of the lane, we
add a small reward that decays exponentially with distance
to the center.
r(s) =

−10, if collision
γe−sl + (1− γ), if l = lgoal
0, if l 6= lgoal
(11)
Here, l = {0, 1} and sl = [0, 1] are the lane and sublane
positions of the robot, explained in Fig. 1, and, γ = 0.3 is a
constant used to make the agent favor the middle of the lane
after it reaches the target lane. The positions l and sl can be
easily determined from the latitudinal position x.
III. APPROACH
The goal of the AV is to perform a set of actions that
optimize the reward it receives over time. To do so, it will
plan for a finite sequence of actions, perform the first one and
re-plan after receiving an observation. Let N be the length
of the sequence, uR = (utR)
N−1
t=0
be a sequence of the AV’s actions and uH = (utH)
N−1
t=0
be those of the human. Then the accumulated reward for the
AV over the sequence starting at a state st is given by
RR(s
t,uR,uH) =
N−1∑
i=0
rR(T (s
t+i, ut+iH , u
t+i
R )). (12)
Here, rR is the instantaneous reward defined in (11) and
the next state st+1 = T (st, utH , u
t
R) is computed using the
dynamics T described in Section II-C. From a state st, the
optimal set of actions for the AV, u∗R, can be found through
the following optimization.
u∗R = arg max
uR
RR(s
t,uR,uH) (13)
In the ideal scenario, uH would hold the HV’s actual future
actions, however, these are unknown. Some previous work
presumed that uH depends only on the state, for instance,
[19] uses a constant velocity model, but a more accurate
model for a rational driver would also be influenced by
the AV’s future plan. We model this influence by assuming
that the human driver plans in an action space that includes
the AV as well and chooses to optimize a reward which
includes the goals of both. This is based on the hypothesis
that driving is not a zero-sum game and people drive with
some consideration of each other’s goals. In this system,
we are indirectly influencing the human agent’s actions by
choosing the reward function for this joint planning system.
A. Planning and Prediction for Collaboration
Our collaborative planning approach determines the opti-
mal set of actions by maximizing the joint reward RJ which
is a weighted combination of the human and robot rewards,
RJ = αRR + (1− α)RH . (14)
Here, α is the selfishness factor which determines the
relative importance of each reward in the collaboration. For
instance, α = 1 is an AV with no consideration for the human
and α = 0 is the opposite, while α = 0.5 equally considers
the goal of both agents. We do not assume apriori knowledge
of α and plan to study its effect with the user study. The
optimal plan for both agents under this model is determined
by the following optimization.
u∗R,u
∗
H = arg max
uR,uH
RJ(s,uR,uH) (15)
Since we do not control the human’s car, the set of actions
u∗H is a prediction of their plan under the influence of
the AV’s plan u∗R. This influence is implicit in our model
through choice of RJ . The AV is controlled by executing the
first action from u∗R and the planning is repeated after every
time-step. This planning is performed by an online search
procedure described next.
B. Limited Horizon Tree Search
The optimization from (15) is implemented as an online
tree-search. Here, the nodes are states containing both human
and AV positions and velocities, from (2). The search starts
at the current state and then simulates taking actions, termi-
nating when either all the unpruned nodes, until maximum
depth, are explored or if the time limit is reached. The time
limit is set to be the length of the simulation time-step
for real-time planning. The action leading to the maximally
rewarding node is chosen and ties are broken randomly.
The algorithm is similar to A∗ search [20] while also
handling multiple unknown goal nodes and a simplified
version is provided in FIND OPTIMAL ACTION() of Algo-
rithm 1. The current state sinit and maximum depth tmax
are used as input, a priority queue open keeps track of
the states to explore and a set closed of those that have
already been explored. States are ordered by f , which is
the sum of their accumulated reward R and the heuristic.
GET REWARD() returns the reward at a state (11), while
rewards[s] maps an explored state to its accumulated re-
ward. IS TERMINAL() checks if a given state is a terminal
one, and GET HEURISTIC() provides an upper bound by
returning the maximum reward in the remaining horizon (or
depth), keeping the search optimal. The TIMER() tracks the
amount of time spent in the search and outputs true in case
the time budget runs out. We also keep track of parent states
and actions (not shown) to efficiently trace-back optimal
actions. In case search is terminated prematurely, the state
with maximal accumulated reward is chosen.
C. Selfish Baseline
Inspiring work from [18] had a similar formulation for
mixed-autonomy driving. However, they determine the AV’s
plan u∗R from (13) by optimizing RR only and the human’s
plan, uH , is determined by optimizing RH , leading to the
following nested optimization.
u∗R = arg max
uR
RR(s,uR, (arg max
uH
RH(s, u˜R,uH)),
(16)
To solve it they make some simplifying assumptions. They
assume a turn-taking scenario where the robot plans first, also
they give the human model access to uR, i.e. u˜R = uR. This
leads to the human considering the robot’s plan as fixed when
planning her response. The reward RR in our task depends
only upon the state of the AV apart from avoiding collisions,
reducing (16) to the selfish α = 1 condition of our approach
because the human-model here considers the plan uR as
fixed. So, the only case that can cause a uR that optimizes
RJ = RR in (15) to be suboptimal in (16) is when the
optimal uH causes a collision. This, however, is prevented
by the high negative reward of collisions for RH .
This formulation works well in scenarios where RR is
designed to encode desired human behavior explicitly. For
instance, they included the negative squared velocity of the
human into RR to reward the AV for slowing down the
human. However, reward functions encoding the agent’s own
goals, rather than those of other drivers, are more intuitive,
Algorithm 1 Finite horizon action search
1: procedure FIND OPTIMAL ACTION(sinit, tmax)
2: Initialize open, closed, rewards as ∅
3: t← 0
4: Push ((sinit, 0), GET HEURISTIC(tmax − 0)) into
open
5: Rmax ← −∞,
6: while open not empty do
7: break if TIMER()
8: (s, t), f ← POP(open)
9: break if f < Rmax . Pruning
10: add s to closed
11: if IS TERMINAL(s, t) then
12: if rewards[s] > Rmax then
13: Rmax ← rewards[s]
14: continue
15: t← t+ 1
16: for all s+ ∈ GET NEIGHBORS(s) do
17: R← rewards[s] + GET REWARD(s+)
18: if (s+ ∈ closed) ∧ (R < rewards[s+]) then
19: continue
20: f+ ← R+ GET HEURISTIC(tmax − (t+ 1))
21: rewards[s+]← R
22: Push ((s+, t+ 1), f+) into open
23: Traceback from state with reward Rmax to find
optimal action (u∗H , u
∗
R)
24: return u∗R
25: procedure GET HEURISTIC(tremaining)
26: return tremaining · rmax
and there, this formulation might lead to selfish behaviors as
shown in our experiments.
D. Implementation Details
The human reward RH was chosen to have the same
simple form as the robot (11). Our results indicate that
the model performs well even with this approximation of
the human’s reward. However, it can easily be replaced by
a learned model in our framework in case sequences for
learning this reward are available, like in [18]. The search
algorithm 1, was implemented in Python. For the simulation
we used the open source Simulation of Urban MObility
(SUMO) [21] software and its in-built visualizer to render
the cars. We used a discrete-time simulation with a time-step
of 0.2 seconds, which also served as the time-limit for the
search algorithm to return an action. The cars were allowed
a maximum longitudinal speed of 30m/s and a lateral speed
of 3m/s, with a lane width of 4m. If the cars start together
with similar speeds it can take multiple seconds even for
the optimal plan, to separate the cars enough so that a lane
merge can commence safely. Thus, the time horizon of the
search was kept at 6 seconds for interesting plans to develop.
However, with a 0.2s time-step this would mean searching
a tree of depth 30 and branching factor of 52 this leads to
exploring 2530 states which is infeasible in 0.2s. To make
Fig. 2: A participant in our user study drives the car using the
keyboard.
this search faster we increased the time-step to 1s in the
planner, which is equivalent to repeating each action for five
time-steps. This, combined with our choice of data-structures
enabled us to typically complete the search in less than 0.2s.
IV. USER STUDY
A human-subject study was conducted to evaluate our
method on the double lane merge scenario described earlier.
A. Independent Variables
We manipulated two aspects of this experiment:
1) Road Length. We used two lengths of the road
{100, 200}m referred to as short-road and long-road.
This creates two levels of difficulty for the experiment
where the more challenging short road scenario gives
the HV and AV less time to complete their merges.
2) Selfishness Factor. The selfishness factor (α), defined
earlier, was given six different values,
α ∈ {0.0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0}
which will be referred to as 0R, .2R, .4R, .6R, .8R,
1R respectively, where the level of the AV’s selfishness
increases with increasing α. We consider the .4R, .6R
agents as fair and 1R agent as selfish in the discussion.
Through these we explored a total of 2× 6 = 12 conditions.
B. Hypotheses
The following hypotheses are tested.
H1 The selfishness factor will have an impact on the hu-
man’s performance on the task. In particular, we expect
the less selfish versions of our algorithm to help improve
the human driver’s performance.
H2 Decreasing selfishness to a fair balance of rewards will
not adversely effect the AV’s performance. We take .4R
and .6R to be fair versions of our approach and expect
that their performance is not significantly worse than
the selfish 1R agent.
C. Experimental Design
We recruited 21 participants, out of which 4 were female
and 17 male, 19 had a valid driver’s license (and were kept),
and 20 were between the ages of 21 and 40 with one older.
The subjects had a top-down view of the environment
and controlled the car using a keyboard, see Fig. 2. Each
participant was instructed to drive their car to the goal
lane, in a safe and natural manner, before the end of the
road. A small window displayed the distance to the end
of the road. There was one other agent (AV) present in
the scene that used indicator-lights to communicate its goal
lane. We did not inform the participants that this agent was
autonomously controlled to avoid biasing the perception of
it. An unrecorded practice scenario was used to familiarize
them with the simulation environment and the controls of
their car. A within-subject design was used to mitigate the
effects of inter-subject variability. Each subject performed
18 trials, each of which was uniformly sampled from one
of the 12 conditions mentioned before. After every trial, a
questionnaire gauged their interaction with the robot on a
three-point scale. The sequences and responses of these trials
were recorded and analyzed. To avoid making the task repet-
itive and losing the user’s interest, we varied start lanes and
the color of the robot’s car through uniform sampling. The
robot’s initial speed was sampled from a normal distribution
with a mean 15m/s and 3m/s standard deviation, while the
human car’s was kept constant at 15m/s. The subjects were
not informed of the variables being manipulated.
V. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A. Objective Measures
We studied the effect of α, using our 325 recorded trials
on two measures, the average reward and the average merge-
time for both agents. The results are shown in Fig. 3. By
reward we refer to the individual rewards RR and RH as
defined in Section 2 and merge-time refers to the amount of
time it takes for an agent to reach their goal lane. Reward is
an obvious choice for a measure of performance because
the planner aims to optimize it for the AV and assumes
that the human driver has a similar goal. We choose merge
time here as a measure of task performance because the
reward function was designed to encode it but also, because
it might be a better measure for what the human drivers are
optimizing. We believe that people do not prefer to take the
risk of waiting to the end of the road to make a lane merge
and will do it early if the opportunity presents itself. So,
if the lane merging goes smoothly it should lead to lower
average merge times.
Human. In Fig. 3 (a) human performance peaks when
the .4R condition is used and in (b) .6R leads to lowest
merge-time. The variation of these measures with the self-
ishness factor supports our hypothesis H1 that the human
performance is affected by the robot’s collaboration. To
test whether the cooperative condition .6R outperforms the
selfish 1R baseline, we compared their merge-times using
an unpaired Student’s t-test and found that the merge-time
was significantly lower for the human (p < 0.05) in the .6R
condition.
Robot. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test the
variation of the AV’s merge-time with different α and was
found to be statistically significant (F(5, 302))= 20.96, p <
0.0001. This affirms that different levels of cooperation
affect the performance of the AV. From Fig. 3 we observe
that the two cooperative settings of .4R and .6R perform
(a) (b)
Fig. 3: Quantitative effect of α. (a) Plots the average reward
accumulated by both agents and (b) shows the time it takes for a car
to merge into its goal lane under all six conditions of the cooperation
factor α. Fig. shows the mean as the line and the standard errors as
the region. We observe that the fair conditions .4R, .6R fare better
than others including the selfish 1R for both agents. Note that higher
rewards and lower merge-times relate to better performance.
equally-well or even better when compared to the selfish 1R
baseline for both measures, supporting our hypothesis H2.
The observation that .6R improves the humans’ ability to
reach the goal is not surprising since it is more considerate
towards the human’s goal. However, it is surprising that
the .6R condition performs better even for the robot than
optimizing its selfish goal. We attribute this to its possession
of a more accurate model of the user’s behavior. During
planning, the 1R assumes that the human actively plans for
the robot’s goal and not her own. However, this is false
and probably leads to it modifying its plan often making
it suboptimal.
In Fig. 3, we also observe that the human is generally
slower at lane merging than the robot. This is because the
AV’s reward favors the fastest lane merge but the subjects
were not instructed to merge as quickly as possible, they
were merely asked to do it before the road ends.
TABLE I: Failure Rate to Reach Goal Lane
0R .2R .4R .6R .8R 1R
HV 15.2% 10.3% 7.5% 4.3% 9.5% 8.3%
AV 52.2% 10.3% 7.5% 2.1% 6.3% 6.7%
Failure Rate. Merge time was only computed for suc-
cessful trials, i.e. trials where the car was able to successfully
merge into its goal lane before the end of the road was
reached. Table I shows the percentage to reach the goal for
the human and the AV. Again, we found that the cooperative
.6R condition outperformed all others, including the 1R,
which means that both the human and AV were able to
reach their goal lanes more often when the robot had a fair
reward function. This lends more support to the hypotheses
H1 and H2. Every condition barring 0R achieves failures
of < 11%, supporting the argument that our framework is
able to perform the task. We explain the reason for this high
incidence of failures for 0R in section V-C.
B. Subjective Measures
After every trial, the participants were asked to answer the
following two questions on a three-point scale.
Q1. Was the other car considerate of your goals?
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Fig. 4: Q1. Was it considerate of your goals?
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Fig. 5: Q2. Did the other car drive safely?
Q2. Did the other car drive safely?
For Q1, we explained that a considerate driver is one
that changes their behavior for the benefit of other drivers.
For instance, in the case of a car waiting to turn left at
an intersection (with no traffic light on a U.S. road), being
considerate at an intersection could mean reducing speed to
give them time to make the turn or it might be better to
speed up and pass them quickly. This notion of consideration
is strongly influenced by the context, e.g. depending on
relative speed, traffic condition, etc. , and can not be easily
determined by a static rule.
Fig. 4 shows the response. Here, the three-point scale goes
from ”No”, to ”Don’t Know”, to ”Yes”. Excluding 0R, the
percentage of considerate trials decreases with increasing
selfishness (α). Supporting the argument that less selfish
agents are perceived more favorably in terms of consider-
ation. A surprising observation is that the agent considered
the least considerate is 0R, the AV which solely optimizes
the human’s reward. We hypothesize that this agent is not
perceived as rational and we believe that people reserve the
considerateness attribute for rationally acting agents. The 0R
agent might be considered irrational because it does not act
in its own self-interest when given the chance, for instance,
even after the human has made a lane change and the agent
is free to merge into its target lane it does not do so and
seemingly takes random actions. This is illustrated in Fig.
6 and the next subsection gives more details on why this
occurs. We believe that rationality is a prerequisite for being
perceived considerate.
Q2 gauges whether the subject felt safe during the inter-
action on a three-point scale, from ”No”, to ”Safe Enough”,
to a ”Yes”. We wanted the participants to use the notion of
safety that they have developed by real-world driving and
so did not provide examples of safety for the scenario. The
results are grouped by the selfishness factor (α) in Fig. 5.
Apart from .8R, every condition seems safe and there is no
clear trend. This leads us to believe that safety is difficult to
(a) (b)
Fig. 6: Effect of α. The lateral position is shown for agents .6R
and 0R for two different trajectories in (a) and (b) respectively. (a)
is a typical lane change sequence where both agents successfully
steer to their goal lane. While in (b), the human again completes
their merge successfully, but the AV takes random steering decisions
making it appear irrational.
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Adaptation to human actions. The first and second rows plot
longitudinal speed and lateral positions respectively. (a) and (b) are
two trajectories. In (a), the human brakes and slows down so the
AV accelerates to get ahead performing the merge afterwards. In
(b), the human accelerates getting ahead of the AV allowing it to
start steering early because it does not have to use the accelerate
action first. Since the initial speeds and selfishness factor were the
similar across columns, the difference in the AV’s behavior can be
attributed to the human’s actions.
judge in this environment due to the detachment caused by
the top-down view as opposed to a first-person view and in
the future, a more involved simulation set-up might be able
to recover it.
C. Qualitative Analysis
In this section we illustrate the behavior of our method
through select examples. In particular, we explore the effects
of the selfishness factor α and of the human driver’s behavior
in Figs. 6 and 7 respectively. Fig. 6 plots the lateral position
(x) of both vehicles with respect to time for two trajectories.
In (a), a typical scenario of a successful merge is shown,
where both the human and AV start steering towards their
goals and after a short time period, reach them. In (b), the
unselfish 0R steers towards its goal lane initially but then
starts steering back and appears to be taking random actions.
This is because 0R optimizes only for RH , i.e. for this AV’s
reward, while the human driver reaching their goal lane is
ideal, their own lane does not matter. This leads the planner
to oscillate between choosing equally rewarding plans that
may lead to either lane. The human in this scenario is aware
of the AV’s goal lane, but not of its peculiar reward function,
and so might conclude from this behavior that the agent is
irrational. We used this argument in Section V-B to explain
why participants in our study did not find the 0R agent to be
considerate. This behavior explains the high high failure rate
for the AV, and it’s departure from the human’s expectation
might also explain the higher failure of the HV, for 0R in
Table I.
Fig. 7 highlights the capability of our approach to adapt
to the human driver’s behavior. Columns (a) and (b) are
two trajectories that were performed with the same .6R
selfishness factor and similar initial conditions but show
different behavior due to the difference in human actions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We proposed a collaborative method for mixed-autonomy
driving that optimizes a collective reward and showed that it
can adapt to the human’s behavior and find feasible solutions.
To do this, we were able to use an approximate reward model
for the humans due to their adaptability and did not require
a large corpus of demonstrations to learn from or hand-code
specific behaviors. Manipulating a single parameter in our
framework gave rise to different levels of cooperation and
we found that optimizing for a fair-share of the reward led to
decreased merge times and failure rates. Providing evidence
for the utility of collaboration in this domain and affirming
our assumption that driving was a non-zero-sum game.
Future. We found that subjective notions of human safety
are difficult to judge in this setup and hope to see future
work utilizing Virtual Reality to create realistic environments
to measure it. An interesting avenue would be to personalize
the selfishness factor and estimate it in an on-line manner
for every interaction. The idea of collaborative planning can
be applied to other domains where agents interact to achieve
personalized goals, for instance, factory robots sharing tools
with a human worker. We think the idea of controlling the
meta-behavior of an AV through variables like a selfishness
factor can be used to personalize an autonomous car to the
comfort of its rider. For example, some people might prefer
an AV that yields easily to other drivers and is generally more
considerate, but the same person may choose to change this
behavior in situations where they are pressed for time.
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